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  Distortions in investment decisions resulting from conflicts of interest between claimholders have 
been modeled extensively in the corporate finance literature.  These models generally imply that firms 
make sub-optimal project choices, either in terms of good projects that are rejected, or bad projects that 
are accepted.  Since it is difficult to observe management forecasts of project net present values, 
especially for projects that are not ultimately undertaken, it is difficult to assess the importance of these 
models quantitatively. 
  One approach to evaluating the importance of investment distortions is to calibrate a model using 
real-world data and then to estimate the magnitude of the distortion in investment decisions by examining 
the characteristics of the projects that the model predicts would be accepted or rejected.  This approach 
has been used to estimate the magnitude of the impact of stockholder/debtholder conflicts on investment 
decisions (Mello and Parsons (1992), Leland (1998), Parrino and Weisbach (1999), and Moyen (2000)).  
Papers that examine stockholder/debtholder conflicts in this way typically assume that managers 
maximize the value of the firms’ stock (i.e., they assume away any conflict of interest between managers 
and stockholders). 
In this paper, we relax this assumption and estimate the magnitude of stockholder/manager 
conflicts, their interactions with stockholder/debtholder conflicts, and their effect on a firm’s investment 
decisions.  In particular, we consider a risk-averse manager who makes a firm’s investment decisions 
while seeking to maximize his own utility function.  In our model, the manager owns shares in a levered 
firm (which he cannot hedge), options on the firm’s stock, and has other wealth that is independent of the 
value of that firm.  The firm is modeled using the dynamic approach of Ju (2001), in which new debt is 
issued when old debt matures, the firm enters bankruptcy if its value hits a pre-specified bankruptcy 
boundary, and interest payments are fully deductible in computing corporate taxes.  The manager has the 
option to undertake a project that would alter the firm’s value process.  If the firm defaults on its debt, the   2 
stock owned by the manager (and other shareholders) becomes worthless and the debtholders recover a 
fixed percentage of the remaining value of the firm. 
  We first estimate the magnitude of these conflicts for a hypothetical firm, constructed to be 
typical of publicly traded firms on the Standard and Poor’s Compustat database.  Before adopting the 
project, the firm is financed with ten-year coupon-bearing debt and has a market debt to total capital ratio 
of 21.90 percent.  We assume that the manager has a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility 
function with a risk aversion parameter of 2 and has 50 percent of his non-option wealth invested in 
shares of the firm, with the remainder invested in risk-free assets.  The value of the project’s assets (e.g., 
the value of the cash flows from operations) is assumed to equal 20 percent of the value of the firm’s 
assets without the project.  We vary the volatility of the value of the assets of the firm with the project 
holding other factors constant to determine the effects of incremental changes in risk. 
  We assume that the manager is considering a project that changes the risk of the firm.  For any 
potential project, we calculate its impact on the value of stockholder and debtholder claims, as well as the 
manager’s utility.  In doing so, we calculate explicitly the changes in the values of the firm’s future tax 
shields and the expected bankruptcy costs.  We characterize the magnitude of stockholder/manager 
conflicts arising from manager risk-aversion by estimating the net present value (NPV) of the project that 
makes the manager indifferent to accepting or rejecting it.  We also compute the implied incremental 
(relative to that required for a zero NPV project) cost of equity that makes the manager indifferent.  The 
mapping between the indifference NPV and the incremental rate of return with the risk of the project 
provides a measure of managerial aversion to project risk, once all factors are considered. 
We find that, in contrast to the usual arguments in the literature, a manager compensated entirely 
with equity-based compensation is likely to favor projects that lower firm risk.  In other words, he will 
want to undertake some projects that lower firm risk even if they have a negative NPV, and to ignore 
some high-risk projects despite the fact that they have a positive NPV.  This effect occurs even though 
risky projects transfer wealth from debtholders to stockholders.  Managerial risk aversion is of course one   3 
factor determining this negative attitude toward risk.  However, in our model, even a risk-neutral 
stockholder will prefer that the firm distort investment decisions towards safe and away from risky 
projects.  The stockholder displays this preference because the values of the firm’s tax shields and 
expected bankruptcy costs (which are borne in part by stockholders since existing debt is replaced with 
fairly-priced new debt when it matures) change with risk.  Our estimates suggest that the changes in the 
values of tax shields and bankruptcy costs at a typical firm are more than sufficient to offset the wealth 
transfer and option effects, leading to risk-averse investment behavior by managers. 
It is often argued that managers’ incentives to take risks increase substantially with firm leverage, 
because wealth transfers between stockholders and debtholders increase with leverage (see Myers 
(1977)).  In our model, wealth transfers do increase with leverage.  However, the values of tax shields and 
bankruptcy costs are also more sensitive to changes in risk when leverage is higher.  The overall relation 
between leverage and risk-taking behavior appears to be nonlinear:  When leverage is low, managers have 
a preference for safe projects.  However, at high leverage ratios, the wealth transfer effect dominates, and 
managers have incentives to take negative NPV projects that increase firm risk. 
We also consider the sensitivity of these results to variation in the parameters.  First, we find that 
the magnitude of the stockholder/manager distortions is very sensitive to the choice of the risk aversion 
parameter.  Second, we vary the fraction of the manager’s wealth invested in the firm.  Changes in the 
fraction of non-firm wealth have an effect similar to changes in the risk aversion parameter; equity in the 
firm owned by managers with high outside wealth represents a relatively low share of their total wealth, 
so they are less sensitive to changes in its value.  Third, we find that larger projects exacerbate the 
distortions attributable to stockholder/manager conflicts.  Fourth, the distortions in investment decisions 
decrease with the duration of the firm’s debt because the larger wealth transfers associated with longer 
maturity debt offset the preference for relatively safe projects to a greater extent.  Fifth, we examine the 
structure of management compensation and its impact on risk-taking behavior.  In our model, not 
surprisingly, options induce better (from the perspective of stockholders) risk-taking behavior than   4 
restricted stock, and options that are issued in-the-money make managers’ substantially more risk averse 
than options issued with exercise prices equal to or greater than the current market price of the firm’s 
stock. 
In addition to estimating the magnitudes of investment distortions for a hypothetical firm, we use 
our model to estimate these distortions at 15 public firms from three industries.  These estimates, based on 
actual CEO equity-based compensation and firm characteristics in this sample, reveal that, with the 
exception of one firm, CEOs with a risk aversion parameter of 2 will prefer to reject some positive NPV 
projects that have asset values that are less than twice as volatile as the asset values of their firms.  This 
evidence suggests that managers can have little incentive to invest in highly risky projects even when they 
receive relatively large amounts of option-based compensation. 
  This paper focuses on conflicts due to differences in risk aversion.  Zingales (2000) suggests that 
these effects are understudied and potentially important considerations in corporate financing decisions.  
While we focus on managerial risk aversion, we do not wish to downplay the importance of other 
stockholder/manager conflicts.  In addition to the risk-related reasons considered here, conflicts between 
stockholders and managers arise because of a tendency of managers to empire-build, concerns about a 
manager’s human capital both inside and outside of the firm, a tendency to focus on short term objectives, 
a propensity to herd and not utilize private information about a project’s quality, a preference for an easy 
job, and finally, overconfidence.  Stein (2001) provides an excellent summary of these considerations. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:  Section I describes the construction and 
solution of the model.  Section II explains how it is calibrated.  Section III discusses implications of the 
model for investment decisions at a typical firm, and Section IV discusses the implications for a sample of 
public firms.  Section V summarizes the results and discusses the extent to which stockholder/manager 
problems of the type considered in this paper are likely to have an important impact on corporate financial 
decisions.   5 
I.  The Models 
We use models based on Ju (2001) to estimate the magnitudes of the agency conflicts discussed 
above.  In these models, the value of the cash flows from a firm’s operations follows geometric Brownian 
motion, and the firm issues debt with a maturity of T, which pays a continuous, constant (tax-deductible) 
coupon.  The manager’s wealth at time zero is divided between non-firm wealth and his stake in the firm, 
which consists of equity shares and standard European call options, which expire at time Tu.  The 
manager cannot sell or hedge his shares or options.  For simplicity, it is assumed that the manager’s non-
firm wealth grows at the risk-free rate, r, and is therefore uncorrelated with the value of the manager’s 
stake in the firm.  The manager’s utility is given by a CRRA utility function defined over his entire 
wealth. 
At time zero the manager has the opportunity to undertake a project.  Without the project, the 
value process of the firm’s assets (i.e., the value of the cash flows from operations) follows geometric 
Brownian motion.  If the manager accepts the project, the value process of the assets still follows 
geometric Brownian motion but with drift and volatility parameters that can differ from those without the 
project, depending on the characteristics of the project.  The manager decides whether to accept the 
project by maximizing, at time zero, his expected utility at time  . u T  
The model is in continuous time with 0. u TT <<   At time zero, the value of the firm’s assets 
without the project is  () 0. NP V
1  The firm’s capital consists of (1)  NP N  shares of stock with a total 
market value of  () 0 NP E  and (2)  NP F  face value of debt that matures at time  . T   The debt pays a coupon 
at a constant annualized rate  NP C  and has a market value of  () 0 NP D .  The coupon rate  NP C  is set so 
that, without the project, the debt is priced at par.  The firm deducts its coupon payments when computing 
its taxes, at an effective rate  , τ  and the tax benefit of the debt at time zero has a value  () 0. NP TB   The 
                                                            
1 The subscript  NP  refers to quantities when the project is not taken (no project) and the subscript P  refers to 
quantities when the project is taken (project).     6 
debt has a protective covenant which specifies that if the firm value at anytime during the life of the debt 
[] 0,T  decreases to an exponential boundary, the firm is forced into bankruptcy.
2  When this occurs, the 
stock becomes worthless and the debtholders recover 1 BC α −  of the value of the assets.  The fraction of 
the value of the assets not recovered by the debtholders is assumed to be consumed in the bankruptcy 
process.  The bankruptcy boundary is an exponential curve that increases at a rate g  and is equal to the 




−   The bankruptcy costs for the firm are the present value of the expected losses in bankruptcy, 
and are denoted by  () 0. NP BC  
The value of the firm’s assets plus the tax benefit of debt equals the value of the debt plus the 
equity plus the bankruptcy costs: 
  () () () () () 00 0 0 0 . NP NP NP NP NP VT B DEB C += + +  (1) 
If the firm does not accept the project at time zero, then the value of the firm’s assets,  () , NP Vt  follows 
geometric Brownian motion described by: 
  ()







µδ σ =−+  (2) 
where  NP µ  and  0 NP σ >  are constants and  () dZ t  is a standard Weiner process.  The firm liquidates 
assets at a rate of δ  of the total value of the firm’s assets, so that  () NP Vt d t δ  equals the sum of the after-
tax coupon paid to debtholders [() 1 NP Cd t τ − ] and a time varying dividend  () DivRate t dt  paid to 
equity holders over the time interval  : dt   
  () () ( ) 1. NP NP V t dt DivRate t C dt δτ =+ −    (3) 
                                                            
2 We are implicitly assuming here that this covenant acts somewhat like the actual covenants seen in bond indenture 
agreements.  These covenants are designed to enable debtholders to seize assets when they are in danger of being 
lost – our assumption models this process explicitly.  See Black and Cox (1976) and Ju (2001) for other papers using 
this approach.   7 
 
In order to guarantee that the dividend rate is non-negative, we require that 
 
  () ( ) 1. NP NP Vt C δτ ≥−   (4) 
The value of δ  is specified exogenously as a model parameter. 
At time zero a project costing  P COST  becomes available.  If the manager accepts this project, 
the value of the assets becomes  () 0. P V   This implies that (ignoring the impact on bankruptcy costs and 
tax benefits if the firm adopts the project) the NPV of the project is given by: 
  () () 00 PN P P NPV V V COST =− −  (5) 
If the project is taken, the value of the assets,  () , P Vt follows geometric Brownian motion described by: 
  ()







µδ σ =− +  (6) 
where  P µ  and  0 P σ >  are constants.  Consequently, if the project is accepted the net impact on the 
current and future value of the firm’s assets is to change the value of these assets at time zero from 
() 0 NP V  to  () 0 P V  and to change the parameters of the geometric Brownian motion obeyed by the assets 
from  NP µ  to  P µ  and  NP σ  to  . P σ   The firm still liquidates assets at a rate  . δ  
If the manager does not accept the project, the capital structure of the firm does not change.  If the 
project is accepted, it is financed with fairly priced debt and equity.  Any new debt that is issued has 
exactly the same characteristics as the old debt (i.e., it has the same priority, pays a coupon that is the 
same percentage of the face value, and has time T  to maturity.)  Let  P N  be the number of shares 
outstanding,  P F  the face value of debt outstanding, and  P C  the constant annualized coupon rate paid 
after the project is financed.  Then 
  () PN P P N P CCF F =  (7) 
   8 
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   −−
=+   
  
 (8)   
 
and the value of the firm’s assets becomes 
  () () () () () 000 0 0 PP P P P VDEB CT B =++ −  (9) 
where  () () () () 0 , 0 , 0 , and  0 PP P P DEB C T B  are the time zero values of debt, equity, bankruptcy costs, 
and tax benefit to debt respectively, when the manager accepts the project. 
To solve the model, we must choose how the project is financed.  We specify three alternative 















Under the second financing rule, the firm is required to finance the project using quantities of new debt 
and equity so that the market value of each dollar of face value of the debt does not change: 




=  (11) 
 
The final version of the model requires that the ratio of the market values of the newly issued debt to 
equity is the same as the ratio of the market values of the debt to equity before the project is adopted: 
















The financing rule matters because potential projects will affect the firm’s total risk, and also, 
therefore, the relative values of its securities.  For example, consider a project that substantially increases 
a firm’s risk.  With such a project, in order to obey the financing rule keeping the market debt to equity 
ratio constant (equation (10)), the project will have to be financed with a disproportionately large fraction 
of debt, since the value of existing debt will decrease with the addition of a risky project.  Unfortunately, 
this is not particularly realistic, since risky projects are typically financed with relatively more equity.  In   9 
contrast, equation (11), which holds the value of the outstanding debt constant, would require the firm to 
retire some existing debt so that current debtholders would remain whole.  Again, this is not consistent 
with the way that firms usually finance projects.  The third rule, which constrains the firm to issue new 
securities in the same proportion as the pre-project relative values of old securities (equation (12)), is 
perhaps the most realistic of the three.  We therefore use this financing rule as our “base case”.  We 
present some results using the other rules as well, because it is informative to see which projects are 
attractive to the manager when accepting them does not change the leverage of the firm or the well being 
of the current debtholders. 
At time zero the manager’s stake in the firm consists of  () Man NP NN <  shares and  Calls N  
European call options with strike price K  that expire at time  . u T   For purposes of computational 
tractability, we assume that the firm buys the shares necessary to facilitate exercise of the manager’s calls 
from a third party.  Hence, if the manager exercises the calls at time  , u T  he effectively buys  Calls N  shares 
from the third party at a price of  Calls NK  dollars.
3   We assume that the manager cannot sell or hedge 
either his shares or his options.  In addition, at time zero the manager has  () 0 NFW  dollars of non-firm 
wealth.  For simplicity, this wealth is assumed to grow at the risk-free rate.  The manager decides whether 
to accept the project at time zero by maximizing his expected utility at time  u T , which is described by 

















where γ  is a risk-aversion parameter and 
u T Wealth  is the manager’s total wealth at time  . u T  
                                                            
3 We have also formulated and solved the model for the situation in which the manager’s options are issued directly 
by the firm.  In this case, if the manager exercises his options, the firm issues  Calls N  new shares of stock, which are 
given to the manager, and the manager pays  Calls NK  to the firm, which is invested in a scaling project.  It took on 
the order of 10,000 times longer to compute solutions to this version of the model.  Consequently, it would not be 
feasible to provide the analysis presented below with these types of options.  We believe, however, that the results 
would be similar for the model with this alternative type of managerial options.   10 
  The value of the debt, the bankruptcy costs, and the tax benefit of debt are computed from the 
probability density function for first hitting the exponential bankruptcy boundary.  Let 
() ()
*;0 , , , , , ftV A g r δσ  be the probability density for first hitting a boundary described by 
gt Ae  at a 
time 
* t , where  A is a constant, if the variable V initially has a value  () 0 VA >  and follows geometric 
Brownian motion with drift r δ −  and volatility  . σ   In our model,  A is the value of the bankruptcy 
boundary at time zero, so that  A is equal to 
gT
NP Fe
−  if the project is foregone and is equal to 
gT
P Fe
−  if 
the project is accepted.  An explicit expression for  () ()
*;0 , , , , , ftV A g r δσ  is provided in Ju (2001).  
Next define: 
  () () () ()
**
0
,0 , , , , , ;0 , , , , ,
T
GTV Agr f t V Agr d t δσ δσ ≡ ∫  (14) 
 
  () () () ()
0
,0 , , , , , ;0 , , , , ,
T
rt HTV Agr e ft V Agr d t δσ δσ
− ≡ ∫  (15) 
and 




,0 , , , , , ;0 , , , , , .
T
rg ITV Agr e ftV Agr d t δσ δσ
−− ≡ ∫  (16) 
 
Closed form solutions for these expressions are derived in Ju (2001).  These expressions are reproduced 
in section A.1 of the Appendix. 
  Following Leland and Toft (1996) and Ju (2001), the value of the debt at time zero is the sum of a 
contribution from the coupon, a contribution from the payment to debtholders if bankruptcy occurs, and 
the repayment of the face value at time T  if bankruptcy does not occur: 
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∫  (17) 
or 
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  Another modeling decision involves the question of whether the firm should refinance maturing 
debt.  Ju (2001) presents two alternative models:  The first is a “static” model, in which the firm does not 
refinance debt, and becomes an all-equity firm subsequent to the time the debt matures.  The second is a 
“dynamic” model in which new debt is reissued at the time of maturity.  Since the dynamic framework 
seems a priori more appealing, and in fact Ju shows that the refinancing assumption can affect corporate 
financing decisions ex ante, we analyze stockholder/manager conflict under the dynamic model.  
Nonetheless, it is convenient to present the solution of the dynamic model in terms of that for the static 
model that we develop now. 
  In the static model, when the firm is forced into bankruptcy at time 
*, t  the bankruptcy costs are 
()
*
BCVt α .  Hence, at time zero the value of the bankruptcy costs are 
  () () () () {}
* * **
0
0; 0 , , , , , , ,
T
gt T rt gT
iB C i i i i BC Fe e f t V Fe g r dt i NP P αδ σ
− −− =∈ ∫  (19) 
or 
  () () () {} 0, 0 , , , , , , ,
gT gT
iB C i i i i BC Fe I T V Fe g r i NP P αδ σ
−− =∈  (20) 
The tax benefits of debt accrue to the firm as long as it has not gone bankrupt.  Consequently, the tax 
benefits of debt in the static model can be computed by 
  () () () () {}
* **
0
01 , 0 , , , , , , ,
T
rt gT
ii i i i TB Ce G t V Fe g r dt i NP P τδ σ
−− =− ∈ ∫  (21) 
 
or   12 
() () () () () () ()
{}
01 1 , 0 , , , , , , 0 , , , , , ,
,
gT rT gT i
ii i i i i i
C









The value of the equity is equal to the value of the assets plus the tax benefits of debt minus the 
bankruptcy costs minus the value of the debt: 
  () () () () () { } 00 0 00 , , ii i ii EVT BB CD i N P P =+ − − ∈  (23) 
 
In order to compute the manager’s time zero expectation of his utility at time  , u T  let  ()
K
u VT  be 
the value of the firm’s assets at time  u T  that makes a share of stock worth K  at time  . u T   Then the 
manager’s time zero expectation of his utility at time  u T  is the sum of three components.  The first 
component is a function of the probability density for the value of the firm’s assets being at various levels 
above  ()
K
u VT  at time  u T  without having touched the bankruptcy boundary between time zero and time 
u T .  The second component is a function of the probability density for the value of the firm’s assets being 
at various levels below  ()
K
u VT  at time  u T  without having touched the bankruptcy boundary between 
time zero and time  u T .  The third component is the utility derived from his non-firm wealth if the 
bankruptcy boundary is hit.  Let  () () () 0, , , , , , , gV VT TAgµδσ  be the density function for starting at 
a value  () 0 VA >  and being at  ()
gT VT A e >  at time  0 T > without ever hitting the boundary 
gt Ae  in 
the interval  [] 0, tT ∈  when the V  process follows geometric Brownian motion with drift µδ −  and 
volatility  . σ  An explicit expression for  () () () 0, , , , , , , gV VT TAgµδσ  is presented in Ju (2001).  
Then at time zero, the manager’s expectation of his utility at time  u T  without and with the project are 
given by   13 
() ( ) () () () ()
()
() ( ) () ()
() () () () ()
()
() ( ) () ()
0
0, , , , , , ,







i u iu iu iu iu C a l l s
T
gT
ii u u i i i u
T
ui u i u i u i u
gT







TV T T B T B C T D T N K
g V V T T Fe g dV T
TV T T B T B C T D T
g V V T T Fe g dV T
UN
N Utility U NFW
N



















() ()() () {}
0
;0 , , , , , , ,
u T
gT





iu VT  satisfies the following equation: 
  () () () () {} ,, .
K
i u iu iu iu
i
VT T B T B C T D T
Ki N P P
N
+− −
=∈  (25) 
 
Note that all terms in the numerator of the right hand side of equation (25) are a function of  ().
K
iu VT 
Next we extend the model to a more realistic dynamic setting.  As in the static case, at time zero 
the firm has debt outstanding with T  years to maturity and the manager decides whether to accept a 
project.  Now, however, if the firm has not gone bankrupt at the end of T  years, the firm issues new T -
year debt at time  . T   The new debt pays a coupon of either  () ()0 NP NP NP CV T V  or  () ()0, PP P CV T V  
respectively, depending upon whether the firm has foregone or accepted the project at time zero.  
Similarly, as shown in Ju (2001), all other securities will be scaled by a factor of  () ()0 NP NP VT V  or 
() ()0, PP VTV  because at time T  the firm is identical to itself at time zero except that it is 
() ()0 VT V  as large.  The process of issuing new T -year debt each time existing debt matures 
continues indefinitely until the firm goes bankrupt. 
In this dynamic setting, the price of the debt is still given by equation (18).  The firm value, 
however, will reflect the costs and benefits of the debt issued in the future until the firm goes bankrupt.  In   14 
order to determine the total tax benefit and total bankruptcy cost of the current and potential future issues 
of debt, the following quantity will be useful: 
  [] {}
()












1  (26) 
 
The indicator function  [] {} Firm does not go bankrupt over  0,T 1  is equal to one if the firm does not go bankrupt over the 
interval [] 0,T  and zero otherwise.  The expectation is taken over the risk-neutral Q measure.  Ju (2001) 
shows that φ  is given by the following expression: 
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It is also shown in Ju (2001) that the total tax benefit of debt and the total bankruptcy costs are given by 





























Similarly to equation (23), the value of the equity is equal to the value of the assets plus the tax benefits of 
debt minus the bankruptcy costs minus the value of the debt: 
  
  () () () () () { } 00 0 00 , , .
Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic
ii i ii EV T BB CD i N P P =+ − − ∈  (32)   15 
 
The value of the debt is the same in the static and the dynamic model. 
II.  Calibrating the Model 
The total value of the firm’s assets without the project is normalized to $100 at time  0 T .  This 
value (plus the tax benefit of debt) is divided between debtholders, stockholders who own a total of 100 
shares, and bankruptcy costs.  We assume that the manager of the firm owns a 0.32 share of stock and a 
10-year exchange traded European call option on an additional 0.38 share.
4  The strike price for the call 
option is set equal to the time zero value of a share of equity of the firm without the project.  For the base-
case, the manager’s non-firm wealth is assumed to equal the time-zero value of the shares that the 
manager owns without the project.  Consistent with the literature, we assume the manager’s risk aversion 
parameter γ  equals 2 (see pp. 258-260 of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000) for a discussion of the 
interpretation of this value and other values of γ  used in the sensitivity analysis).  We also assume that the 
value of the cash flows from operations of the project is sufficient to ensure that the total value of the 
firm’s assets with the project equals $120 at time  0 T . 
Given these assumptions, calibration of the model requires estimates of (1) the risk-free rate, r,  
(2) the effective tax rate,  , τ  (3) the drift parameter for the total value of the firm, µ , (4) the volatility of 
the total value of the firm with no project,  NP σ , (5) the level of dividends, DivRate, paid by the firm, (6) 
the face value of the debt with no project, FNP, (7) the volatility of the total value of the firm with the 
project,  , P σ  (8) the debtholder bankruptcy recovery rate, () 1 BC α − , and (9) the bankruptcy boundary’s 
exponential growth rate, g.  Where possible, we estimate these parameters using data from the end of 
January 2001, so that the model’s implications are realistic and reasonably current.  
                                                            
4 The manager’s stock and option holdings represent the median values for managers at 1,405 firms for which 
sufficient data to estimate these figures are available for 1999 on the ExecuComp database.   16 
As our estimate of the risk-free rate, we use the rate on 10-year Treasury bonds as of January 30, 
2001 as reported in the February 7, 2001 edition of Standard & Poor’s The Outlook.  This rate equals 5.22 
percent. 
We estimate the tax rate used to calculate the tax shields from the debt using data on estimated 
marginal tax rates (before interest expense) provided by John Graham, who constructed these estimates 
using the approach described in Graham (1996).  In particular, for the base case, we assume that the tax 
rate equals the median marginal tax rate of 34 percent for the 5,519 firms for which 1999 estimates are 
available. 
We set the drift parameter of the firm, µ , equal to 5 percent.  This value is consistent with an 
expected long-term inflation rate of 2.5 percent and 2.5 percent real growth.  The 2.5 percent long-term 
inflation rate is consistent with five-year estimates published by WEFA (formerly Wharton Econometric 
Forecasting Associates) for the Consumer Price Index in its US Outlook report for December 2000. 
To estimate the volatility of the total value of the firm’s assets with no project,  NP σ , we examine 
the sample of 1,043 firms for which the necessary data are available on COMPUSTAT for the entire 1980 
to 1999 period.  The median value of the annual standard deviation of the percentage change in firm value 
for the 1,043 firms, 0.2852, provides a lower bound for our estimate of  NP σ .
5  This value is a lower 
bound because there is a survivorship bias in the sample.  We use 0.32 as our estimate of the value of 
NP σ  for the universe of firms. 
We set the dividend rate, DivRate, equal to 1.5 percent in the base case.  Because this rate is 
stated as a percentage of the unlevered value of the firm, we use a number that is on the lower end of the 
1.50 to 2.0 percent dividend yield paid by public firms at the beginning of 2001. 
                                                            
5 This estimate is only an approximation, as it does not incorporate bankruptcy costs, which are not observable.  It is 
relatively insensitive to the sample and period.  Estimates of σ NP range from 0.2513 to 0.3333 for different time 
periods (ten and 20 years) and samples (firms for which all data are available for the full 20 year period and for 
which data are only available for ten years).  
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We base our choice of the face value of the debt at the firm with no project on the distribution of 
the ratio of the book value of debt to the book value of debt plus the market value of the equity for all 
6,974 firms for which there are sufficient data to estimate this ratio on COMPUSTAT in 1999.  This 
distribution is:  
 Percentile      Equity/TC      Debt/TC 
 0%  0.00%  100.00% 
 10%  25.10%  74.90% 
 20%  41.40%  58.60% 
 30%  54.00%  46.00% 
 40%  66.50%  33.50% 
 50%  78.10%  21.90% 
 60%  88.50%  11.50% 
 70%  95.20%  4.80% 
 80%  98.80%  1.20% 
 90%  99.90%  0.10% 
 100%  100.00%  0.00% 
 
  This distribution illustrates the wide variation in capital structures that is observed in public U.S. 
firms.  We select the face value of the debt with no project, FNP = $22.47, so that its market value equals 
the median value of this distribution (21.90 percent) at time 0.  Because of the importance of this 
parameter, we also present results for alternative capital structures. 
  The volatility of the value of the firm’s assets with the project,  , P σ  is computed based on the 
volatility of the value of the firm’s assets with no project (0.32), the volatility of the value of the assets of 
the project (set equal to the volatility of the value of the firm’s assets with no project), a correlation 
between total firm (with no project) and project asset value volatilities of 0.5, and a project with a value 
equal to 20 percent of the value of the firm, using the standard portfolio formula.  This yields a value of 
0.29695 for the base case volatility of the firm’s assets with the project.   P σ  ranges from 0.2667 to 
0.5583 in the base-case sensitivity analyses below.  This range corresponds to that used by Parrino and 
Weisbach (1999) where the volatility of the project varies from zero to approximately eight times the 
volatility of the firm without the project.   18 
  The debtholder bankruptcy recovery rate and the exponential growth rate for the bankruptcy 
boundary are selected to yield an expected recovery rate of 45 percent and a spread over the 10-year 
Treasury bond rate for the firm’s debt equal to 1.90 percent.  The 45 percent recovery rate is broadly 
consistent with recovery rates published by Hamilton, Gupton, and Berhault (2001).  For the 1981 to 2000 
period, Hamilton, Gupton, and Berhault estimate the mean default recovery rates for senior secured 
bonds, senior unsecured bonds, and subordinated bonds of all ratings to equal 53.9 percent, 47.4 percent, 
and 32.3 percent, respectively.  The 1.90 percent spread over the Treasury bond rate equals the spread for 
10-year A-rated corporate debt as of January 30, 2001, as reported in the February 7, 2001 edition of 
Standard & Poor’s The Outlook.  The bankruptcy recovery and bankruptcy boundary growth rates for our 
base case equal 0.5194 (!BC = 0.4806) and 5.19 percent, respectively. 
  Panel A of Table I summarizes our parameter choices.  These choices are used to derive the set of 
parameters that are presented in Panel B of Table I. 
III.  Implications of the Models for Investment Decisions 
  This section discusses the implications of our models for investment decisions at a hypothetical 
“typical firm.”  We first summarize the implications of the models using the base case parameters 
presented in Panel A of Table I.  We then perform sensitivity analyses where we consider how the results 
change with alternative parameters choices. 
A.  Base-Case Results 
  Tables II through IV present statistics describing the impact of a zero NPV project on variables in 
the models discussed above.
6  In each case, the project is a zero NPV project that increases the value of 
the firm’s assets by 20 percent.
7  The present values of tax shields and bankruptcy costs change in each 
                                                            
6 Throughout the paper we define a project's NPV as the change in the present value of a firm's assets, minus the 
project's cost.  Note that this definition excludes financing effects in that it does not directly account for the effect of 
a project on the firm's tax shields or bankruptcy costs.  These effects are accounted for separately in Tables II 
through IV. 
7 This size assumption (among others) is relaxed below when we perform sensitivity analyses in Section III.B.   19 
case because the project alters the firm’s capital structure and business risk, thereby affecting the size of 
the debt tax shield, conditional on the firm being able to utilize it, as well as the probability distribution of 
bankruptcy, and therefore the ability of the firm to utilize the debt tax shield. 
  Table II summarizes the most important statistics for the case using the financing rule where the 
market debt/total capital ratio for the project financing equals the pre-project market debt/total capital 
ratio of the firm.  We focus on this case because we believe it is the most plausible of the financing rules 
we consider.  For comparison purposes, we also present results for similar firm, project, and manager 
characteristics under the other two financing rules in Tables III and IV.  The results in each table are 
based on the parameter values listed in Table I, except that the volatility of the value of the assets of the 
firm with the project is varied from 26.67 percent to 55.83 percent. 
  The first two rows in Tables II through IV report the volatility of the value of the firm’s assets 
both without and with the project.  Because of the different financing assumptions, the leverage ratios 
with the project vary substantially across Tables II through IV, despite the fact that, in all scenarios, in 
each table, the firm’s debt to total capital ratio without the project is set equal to 21.90 percent.  In Table 
II, using the financing rule requiring the new project to be financed with debt and equity in the same 
proportion as that at the firm without the project, post-project leverage is slightly higher than pre-project 
leverage with projects that produce low firm volatilities, and declines moderately as projects produce 
higher firm volatilities (Row 4).  With low-risk projects (i.e., those that lower the volatility of the firm’s 
asset value), existing debt becomes less risky and hence more valuable (Row 11).  Meanwhile, the value 
of debt tax shields increases due to a lower probability of default (Row 25), causing the value of the 
existing equity to also increase (Row 19), despite the wealth transfer to debtholders.  The net result of 
these changes is that the value of the existing debt increases slightly more, in dollar terms, than the value 
of the equity, resulting in an increase in leverage.  As project risk increases (i.e., as the volatility of the 
firm with the project increases), both debt and equity decrease in value due to increasing bankruptcy costs   20 
and a decreasing tax shield value.  The net effect of these changes is to cause the value of the debt to 
decline more rapidly than the value of the equity. 
  Table III illustrates the case where the project is financed so that existing debtholders do not 
suffer any gain or loss on the value of their claims.  In this model, leverage ratios change dramatically 
depending on the riskiness of the project that is adopted.  For example, the leverage of the firm increases 
to 28.71 percent with a project that reduces firm volatility to 26.67 percent, while leverage decreases to 
only 4.89 percent with a project that increases firm volatility to 55.83 percent (Row 4).  The reason for 
this strong negative relation between project risk and leverage is that existing debt becomes more risky as 
the volatility of the firm almost doubles from 32.00 percent to 55.83 percent.  In order to offset this 
increase in risk and make the existing debtholders indifferent, the quantity of debt outstanding must be 
reduced (implicitly assuming that the debt is repurchased from some debtholders at a fair price).  Finally, 
the results in Table IV are for the financing scenario in which market debt/equity ratio is held constant at 
the pre-project ratio of 21.90 percent. 
A.1.  Changes in the Values of Equity and Debt Claims 
  As suggested by Fama and Miller (1972), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Myers (1977), 
undertaking a zero NPV project that causes firm volatility to change will in general transfer wealth 
between stockholders and debtholders.  In the absence of other factors, a zero NPV project that increases 
firm risk transfers wealth from debtholders to stockholders, and a zero NPV project that decreases firm 
risk transfers wealth from stockholders to debtholders. 
  However, there are other factors that complicate this relation in a levered firm.  In particular, 
changing firm risk affects the expected value of both interest tax shields and bankruptcy costs.  To 
illustrate this point, suppose that a firm adopts a project that decreases the firm’s overall risk.  This will 
increase the probability that the firm will be able to utilize the tax shields in any period, increasing the 
value of the tax shields.  In addition, expected bankruptcy costs decrease because the probability of 
default is reduced.  These effects are, of course, reversed if the firm adopts a project that increases firm   21 
risk.  The wealth transfers between claimholders, as well as the changes in the values of the tax shields 
and bankruptcy costs, determine the net changes in the values of existing equity and debt when a project 
is financed with fairly priced debt. 
  Tables II through IV illustrate how the overall effect of adopting a project that alters firm risk on 
the value of stockholder and debtholder claims can be decomposed to compare the relative sizes of the 
various factors that affect these values.  The wealth transfers are most easily seen in Rows 14 and 22, 
which indicate changes in the values of original debt and equity, when taxes and bankruptcy costs are 
zero.  In all cases, except the one in which original debtholders are made whole and wealth transfers are 
ruled out by construction (Table III), debt values increase (decrease) and equity values decrease (increase) 
when a low-risk (high-risk) project is adopted.  Note that these are pure wealth transfers, as the changes in 
the values of the equity and debt claims always exactly offset each other. 
  Rows 25 and 28 in Tables II through IV present the changes in values of the tax shields and 
bankruptcy costs under the alternative financing assumptions when the tax rate and bankruptcy costs are 
not set equal to zero.  The figures in these rows indicate that tax shields decrease with project risk and that 
bankruptcy costs increase with project risk.  These changes, along with the wealth transfer effect, 
combine to determine the changes in the value of original debt and equity, indicated in Rows 11 and 19 of 
Tables II through IV. 
  Comparison of the relative magnitudes of these effects provides useful insights.  The effect of 
changing firm risk on the value of tax shields is large relative to the wealth transfer effect for the typical 
firm.  For example, given the assumptions underlying the analysis in Table II, a low risk project that 
decreases firm volatility to 26.67 percent transfers $0.40 from stockholders to debtholders (see Table II, 
Rows 14 and 22).  The argument is often made (e.g., Myers (1977)) that this risk shifting is one reason 
stockholders might avoid low risk projects.  However, undertaking this project adds $1.66 to the value of 
the tax shields (Row 25), more than four times as much value as is transferred from the stockholder to the 
debtholders with the same project.  Most of this value accrues to the stockholders.  When the change in   22 
bankruptcy costs is taken into account (-$0.79 in Row 28), the net gain to stockholders is $1.14 from this 
project.
8  Note that there is no conflict between stockholders and debtholders from this zero NPV project; 
the debtholders gain $1.31 as well, because the low-risk project decreases the default risk of their claims.
9 
  The value of equity claims actually decreases when a high-risk project is adopted, despite the 
wealth transfer to stockholders.  For example, Table II shows that, while the adoption of a project that 
produces a firm volatility of 55.83 percent results in a wealth transfer of $2.31 from debtholders to 
stockholders, the reduction in the value of debt tax shields, -$0.73 in Row 25, and increased bankruptcy 
costs, $5.52 in Row 28, more than offset the impact of the wealth transfer on share values, even after 
accounting for the change in the value of the debtholder claims.  The net result is a decrease in 
stockholder wealth of $0.82 (Row 19). 
  These estimates suggest that, at least for firms with moderate leverage, the usual intuition derived 
from agency theory is reversed once tax effects and bankruptcy costs are taken into account.  In contrast 
to the intuition from Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977), it appears that there is little 
disagreement between debtholders and stockholders over project choice.  All other things equal, both 
debtholders and stockholders prefer safe projects to risky ones; wealth is in fact transferred, but the 
wealth transfer is more than offset by the changes in taxes and bankruptcy costs. Note that this argument 
does not rely on managerial risk aversion, which will exacerbate the tax and bankruptcy cost effects. 
  Our perspective on tax and bankruptcy effects differs from that typically found in corporate 
finance textbooks.  Taxes and bankruptcy costs are usually discussed in corporate finance courses in the 
context of the “Tradeoff” theory of capital structure, in which, ex ante, firm managers trade-off the 
relative benefits and costs in choosing a capital structure.  The results in Tables II through IV suggest that 
once a capital structure is chosen, taxes and bankruptcy costs have values that are affected by the 
                                                            
8 The reason changes in bankruptcy costs accrue to the stockholders in addition to the debtholders is that, in our 
dynamic model, stockholders bear the incremental changes in the cost of capital when they issue debt in the future. 
9 Note that the total change in the value of debt plus equity equals the change in the value of the tax shields minus 
the change in bankruptcy costs in Tables II through IV.  For example, in the first column of Table II, the change in 
the value of the debt ($1.31) plus equity ($1.14) equals $2.45.  The change in the value of the tax shields ($1.66) 
minus the change in bankruptcy costs (-$0.79) also equals $2.45.   23 
investment decisions made by managers.  Therefore, ex post, once the capital structure is chosen, tax and 
bankruptcy costs create investment distortions that have not been emphasized in the literature.  
Incorporating these effects into a theory of optimal capital structure would be a fruitful topic for future 
research. 
A.2.  Changes in the Manager’s Utility 
  We evaluate the impact of the project from the manager’s perspective in the bottom panel of 
Tables II through IV.  In these panels, we characterize the distortion in investment decisions by estimating 
the project cost necessary to make the manager indifferent as to whether the project is accepted.  To do 
this, we solve for the project cost that sets the change in the manager’s utility equal to zero.  This cost will 
generally be different from the cost at which the project has a zero NPV; for projects that reduce firm 
volatility, this cost will typically be higher than the zero NPV cost, and for projects that increase firm 
volatility, it will typically be lower.  Each of these cost estimates implies an “indifference NPV,” which is 
the NPV at which the manager is indifferent between accepting and rejecting a project with a specified 
volatility. 
  To evaluate the importance of these distortions, it is useful to express them in terms of 
incremental rates of return.  Since our model is based on a value process that does not explicitly model 
cash flows, we must first calculate the implied level of cash flows from operations for the project.  The 
implied initial cash flow from operations for the project is computed as CF = ∆V (WACC - µ ) where ∆V 
is the change in the value of the firm’s assets if the project is adopted, WACC is the weighted-average 
cost of capital of the firm at time zero, and µ  is the drift parameter of 0.05.  The WACC is computed 
using the leverage of the firm with the project, a tax rate of 34.0 percent (estimated from 1999 simulated 
tax rates provided by John Graham), a cost of debt estimate based on the leverage of the firm, and a cost 
of equity estimate based on the CAPM.  The cost of debt is obtained by first estimating a probable credit 
rating for the firm’s debt based on its capital structure using data from Moody's Financial Ratio Medians 
for Global Investment Grade Corporates, January 2001.  This credit rating is then used to compute the   24 
cost of debt by adding the spread over the risk-free rate, for debt with the probable credit rating, reported 
for January 30, 2001 in the February 7, 2001 issue of Standard and Poor’s The Outlook.  The cost of 
equity is estimated from the CAPM using an asset beta of 0.76 that is levered to reflect the leverage of the 
firm at time zero, a risk-free rate of 5.22 percent and a market risk premium of 7.40 percent.  This 
calculation models the cash flows from operations of the project as a growing perpetuity with a growth 
rate equal to the drift parameter,µ , from our model. 
  We next assume that the cost of the project equals the cost that makes the manager indifferent and 
solve for the cost of equity implied by our estimate of the level of the initial operating cash flows from the 
project, again modeling the cash flows from operations for the project as a growing perpetuity with a 
growth rate equal to the drift parameter from our model.  Finally, we compute the incremental cost of 
equity where the manager is indifferent as the difference between the cost of equity estimated this way 
and the cost of equity used to estimate the implied initial cash flow from operations for the project 
(described in the previous paragraph).  This incremental cost of equity has a natural interpretation as the 
extra cost, in rate of return terms, of the net agency costs between stockholders, debtholders, and 
managers. 
  These effects are illustrated in the bottom panels of Tables II through IV.  Row 31 in these tables 
indicates the project cost for which the managers are indifferent towards taking the project.  The 
manager’s “indifference NPV,” which equals the value of the project, $20, minus the “indifference cost” 
from Row 31, is presented in Row 32.  This is converted to an “incremental cost of equity” in Row 38. 
  As can be seen in each table, both the indifference NPV and the incremental cost of equity are 
increasing in project risk.  This relation is determined by a combination of factors.  Two factors, the 
wealth transfers between debtholders and stockholders and the impact of risk on the value of stock 
options, work to make riskier projects more desirable through their impact on the values of the manager’s   25 
shares and options.
10  Working against these factors is the manager’s risk aversion, and the changes in the 
value of debt tax shields, and bankruptcy costs. 
  To facilitate understanding of these various effects, we decompose the incremental rates of return 
and indifference NPVs by factor in Rows 33-37 and Rows 39-43 of Tables II through IV.  In Rows 36 
and 42, we present the incremental cost of equity and indifference NPV for the case of a risk-neutral 
manager without taxes or bankruptcy costs.  Since these results are computed for cases where managers 
are not risk averse and there are no taxes or bankruptcy costs, we would expect that managers prefer more 
risky projects.  Not surprisingly, in each table, the required NPV and the incremental rate of return 
decrease with project risk.  Rows 35 and 41 of these tables present the same variables, except for a risk-
averse manager.  Once risk aversion is added to the model, the relations between the indifference NPV 
and incremental rate of return and project risk change sign and increase in project risk, suggesting that 
with a moderately risk-averse manager (γ  = 2), risk aversion is a more important factor than wealth 
transfers between stockholders and debtholders.
11 
  We add tax effects and bankruptcy effects individually in Rows 33, 34, 39 and 40.  We do so by 
considering the cases where the tax rate equals zero, and where the bankruptcy cost parameter equals zero 
separately.  Not surprisingly, in each of these two cases, the relation between project risk and indifference 
NPVs or incremental rates of return becomes more steeply-sloped than the case with no taxes or 
bankruptcy costs (Rows 35 and 41), but less steep than the case including all effects (Rows 32 and 38). 
B.  Stockholder/Manager Conflicts and Variation in Underlying Parameters 
  The base case analysis documents how the values of equity and debt change when a firm adopts a 
project that changes firm-wide risk, and illustrates the extent to which stockholder/manager conflicts can 
                                                            
10 Carpenter (2000) emphasizes that stock options do not necessarily increase in value with firm risk when held by 
an undiversified executive.  However, given the parameters used here, the “option” effect dominates the risk effect, 
so that the options are increasing in value to the manager when firm risk increases. 
11 Stock options complicate this analysis somewhat.  When we replicate these numbers for the model without stock 
options as seen in Rows 37 and 43 (or with stock options replaced by a comparable amount of common stock in the 
manager’s portfolio) the relations illustrated in lines 36 and 42 become less pronounced, indicating that the option 
effect reinforces the wealth transfer effect rather than the risk aversion effect.     26 
affect the decision to accept or reject potential projects.  The results presented to this point are for a model 
that is calibrated to resemble a typical large, publicly traded firm.  This subsection varies a number of the 
underlying model parameters and examines the sensitivity of the estimates of the magnitude of the impact 
of stockholder/manager conflicts on investment decisions to our choice of model parameters. 
B.1.  Variation in Leverage 
  The magnitude of the impact of project risk on the indifference NPV is illustrated in Figures 1a 
and 1b for firms with differing initial degrees of leverage.  Figure 1a illustrates the indifference NPV for 
different initial leverage ratios, while Figure 1b converts these NPV values into incremental rates of 
return.
12  The lines for 0.01 percent leverage and 21.9 percent leverage (the base case leverage used in 
producing Tables II through IV) slope upward, indicating that as projects get riskier, they become less 
desirable to managers.  Comparing these two lines, the line for 21.9 percent leverage slopes upward more 
steeply than the line for 0.01 percent leverage.  In contrast, when leverage ratios increase to higher levels 
(e.g., 50 percent and 75 percent) the relations between indifference NPV or incremental rate of return and 
volatility become negative, with the more levered firm having the more negatively sloped relation. 
  To understand the patterns of the relations illustrated in Figure 1, it is important to consider the 
various means through which leverage can affect the impact of risk changes on a manager’s utility:  First, 
the magnitude of wealth transfers between stockholders and debtholders increases with leverage.  This 
leads managers to prefer risky projects, since they hold shares and options on the firm’s shares.  The 
remaining factors work in the opposite direction as leverage increases, causing managers of more levered 
firms to prefer less risky projects.  Increasing risk through the adoption of a risky project increases 
expected bankruptcy costs more when a firm has greater leverage.  In addition, risk-induced changes in 
the value of tax shields are sensitive to leverage:  Since the value of debt tax shields, conditional on the 
firm being able to use them, increases with leverage, the impact of a change in risk on the value of debt 
                                                            
12 This figure and the figures discussed below are based on the model in which new projects are financed with debt 
and equity in proportion to the debt and equity in the firm’s existing capital structure.  Comparable figures using the 
other two models lead to similar results.   27 
tax shields is magnified when a firm has more leverage.  Finally, Modigliani and Miller’s Proposition 2 
implies that leverage causes stockholders to bear a disproportionate share of a given increase in firm risk.  
Consequently, risk aversion will lead managers of more levered firms to be less inclined to adopt risky 
projects than similarly risk-averse managers of firms with less debt. 
  Figure 1 indicates that the various factors affecting stock and debt prices have a nonlinear relation 
with leverage.  At low levels of leverage, the fact that higher leverage (e.g., debt to total capital of 21.9 
vs. 0.01 percent) increases the slopes of the lines in Figure 1 suggests that the risk aversion, tax, and 
bankruptcy cost effects, combined, are larger than the wealth transfer effect.  However, as firms become 
highly levered, the wealth transfer effect dominates, so that managers of highly levered firms have 
incentives to invest in projects that increase firm risk.
13  Results not reported in Figure 1 suggest that the 
slope of the lines illustrated in Figure 1 become negative when leverage increases above approximately 
35 percent. 
B.2.  Variation in the Manager’s Risk Aversion 
  The choice of the risk aversion coefficient (γ ) is an important one in an analysis such as this.  
Managerial risk aversion is fundamentally unobservable, yet one of the most important underlying 
variables in all of economics.  Therefore, it is not surprising that the appropriate coefficient of risk 
aversion has been a subject of much debate.  Given our goal of examining the implications of managerial 
risk-aversion on project choice, our approach is to first examine the implications of our model using a 
reasonable parameter value that has been suggested by others and to then examine the sensitivity of the 
results to this parameter value.  In our analysis to this point we have used a value of 2 for γ , based on the 
discussion in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000) (pp. 258-260).  In this subsection we evaluate the sensitivity 
of the estimates from our model to this choice. 
                                                            
13 Andrade and Kaplan (1998) find no evidence of excessive risk-taking in their sample of firms that have highly-
leveraged transactions.   28 
  In Figures 2a and 2b we present graphs of the indifference NPV and the incremental cost of 
equity for our base-case firm with risk aversion parameter estimates of 0 (the risk neutral case), 2, and 5.  
The graphs in Figures 2a and 2b clearly indicate that the distortion due to stockholder/manager conflicts is 
extremely sensitive to γ .  The risk-neutral line is relatively flat at zero in both graphs.  While slightly 
positive for projects that produce firm volatilities less than about 30 percent, the risk neutral line is below 
zero for all other projects, indicating that a risk neutral manager likes zero net present value projects that 
slightly reduce firm volatility, but dislikes those that reduce it substantially.  As risk aversion increases, so 
does the steepness of both curves.  Not surprisingly, as the manager becomes more risk averse, risk-
reducing projects become more attractive and risk-increasing projects become less attractive. 
B.3.  Variation in the Manager’s Non-Firm Wealth 
  Our base-case scenario assumes that the manager’s non-firm wealth equals the value of his stock 
holdings (excluding options).  Since we do not know of reliable data on the outside wealth of corporate 
managers, relative to the value of the shares they hold, this seems to us to be a reasonable starting point.  
However, given the uncertainty about what a reasonable value for the outside wealth of a typical manager 
is, as well as the substantial cross-sectional variation in non-firm wealth that undoubtedly exists, it is 
important to understand the impact of this assumption on the distortion in investment behavior due to 
stockholder/manager conflicts.  Therefore, we present in Figures 3a and 3b estimates of the indifference 
NPV and incremental rates of return for three values of outside wealth, relative to the value of the 
manager’s stockholdings: 10 percent, 50 percent, and 90 percent. 
  As can be seen in Figures 3a and 3b, the level of outside wealth has a dramatic effect on 
investment incentives.  When the manager has a high level of non-firm wealth, the line is almost flat.  The 
high level of non-firm wealth in this case reduces the impact of the manager’s investment decision on his 
total wealth, thereby reducing the impact of the investment decision on his utility.  In contrast, when the 
manager has a low level of non-firm wealth, the lines in Figure 3 slopes steeply upwards.  When non-firm 
wealth is low, the firm’s stock represents a high proportion of the manager’s total wealth, and the   29 
manager is very reluctant to undertake a project that makes the stock more volatile.  Therefore, the 
manager will only accept risky projects that have very large NPVs.  In contrast, when the manager has a 
lot of non-firm wealth, he is relatively diversified, and is more concerned about value than risk when 
making the firm’s investment decisions. 
B.4.  Variation in Project Size 
  In the base-case analysis we assume that the value of the assets of the project equals 20 percent of 
the value of the assets of the firm without the project.  We vary this value from 10 percent to 50 percent 
along with the cost of the project (from $10 to $50) in Figures 4a and 4b.  These figures clearly indicate 
that both the indifference NPV and the incremental cost of equity slope upward more steeply with larger 
projects than with smaller ones.  While these results might appear to be counter-intuitive since the rate of 
return on the projects is similar, the greater impact of the larger projects on the indifference NPV reflects 
the greater impact that these projects have on the volatility of the firm.  For example, while the volatility 
of the assets of the firm with a project 20 percent the size of the firm ranges from 26.67 percent to 55.83 
percent, the corresponding range is from 21.33 percent to 87.64 percent for a project 50 percent the size 
of the firm.  These findings indicate that a larger high-risk project has a disproportionately large impact 
on the distortion of the investment decision when the manager is risk-averse. 
B.5.  Variation in Debt Maturity 
  Our base case model assumes that the firm is financed with ten-year debt.  We select a debt 
maturity of ten years because the duration of this debt is similar to the weighted-average duration of debt 
issued by large corporations.  However, the data suggest that there is substantial cross-sectional variation 
in debt maturity (see Barclay and Smith (1995)).  Therefore, we evaluate the effect of different maturities 
on the stockholder/manager conflicts considered in this paper. 
  Figures 5a and 5b present the results of our model for debt having five-, ten-, and 15-year 
maturities.  The results in Figures 5a and 5b indicate that the longer the duration of the debt, the smaller   30 
the distortions in investment.  The intuition for these results follows from the fact that the tax shield 
effect, the bankruptcy cost effect, and the risk aversion effect are likely to be relatively independent of 
debt duration.  These effects are mainly driven by the size of the debt.  However, duration does affect the 
magnitude of wealth transfer from either risky or safe projects.  The magnitude of these transfers is 
positively related to the maturity of the debt.  Wealth transfers mitigate the effects of a change in firm 
volatility to the manager and on the value of debt tax shields and bankruptcy costs to a greater extent with 
longer-term debt than with shorter-term debt.  As a result, the lines in Figures 5a and 5b are flatter for 
long-term debt. 
B.6.   The Structure of Stock Options 
  Much discussion in the compensation and corporate finance literature concerns the incentives that 
stock options provide and how option grants can best be structured.  (See, for example, Hall and Murphy 
(2000)).  This analysis is typically presented in the context of formal models of stylized firms.  In 
contrast, our model provides a way to examine the effect of stock options on management incentives to 
take risks in the context of a model calibrated to realistically reflect a number of factors not usually 
considered in these models. 
  We first consider the differences between options and stock ownership.  Firms typically grant 
their employees call options as part of their compensation packages.  They do so by choice; in fact some 
firms choose to grant restricted shares instead of options.  Unlike options, restricted shares force 
managers to bear both upside and downside risk. 
  Recall that, in our base case, we set the percentage of the firm’s shares on which the manager 
holds options equal to 0.38 percent and the percentage of shares the manager owns equal to 0.32 
percent.
14  To consider the effects of option and stock holdings on risk-taking, in Figures 6a and 6b we 
                                                            
14 Note that the stock in the model is effectively restricted stock since management is not permitted to sell it or to 
hedge its risk.  Recently, management has become increasingly able to hedge their positions in their personal 
position in their company’s stock using derivatives (see Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2001)).  Modeling the costs 
and benefits of such hedging behavior explicitly is likely to become more important as more managers hedge their 
portfolios in this manner.   31 
compare the base case to cases where the same overall fractional ownership, 0.70 percent, is represented 
entirely by option holdings or by stock holdings. 
  Figures 6a and 6b tell a fairly straightforward story.  The plot for the case where the manager has 
all options slopes downward.  The base case plot, as before, slopes upward, and the plot for the case 
where the manager holds only stock slopes upward more steeply than for the base case.  These results 
reflect the fact that the value of the options increases with risk.  This increase in option value more than 
offsets the tax shield and bankruptcy cost effects and managerial risk aversion with high-risk projects 
when the manager holds only options.  In contrast, when the manager holds only stock, the indifference 
NPVs and incremental rates of return increase with the risk of the project.  These results suggest that one 
advantage of options over restricted stock is that they provide better risk-taking incentives. 
  Another question we examine, considered in detail in Hall and Murphy (2000), is how firms 
should set the exercise price of the option.  The exercise price is typically set equal to the stock price at 
the time of the option award.  Figures 7a and 7b present estimates from our model which allow us to 
compare three cases:  the base case in which options held by the manager have an exercise price equal to 
the fair market value of the shares of the firm without the project, as well as cases in which the option 
exercise prices equal 50 percent and 150 percent of stock value. 
  Figure 7 shows that setting the exercise price equal to 100 percent and 150 percent of the stock 
value leads to virtually identical risk-taking behavior.  However, when options are structured with the 
exercise price equal to 50 percent of the market price, distortions from risk-taking are substantially larger.  
This result makes intuitive sense, since in-the-money options are more like stock than at-the-money or 
out-of-the-money options.  With in-the-money options, management is more averse to downside 
movements in stock value, and thus requires a higher rate of return to undertake risky projects. 
IV.  Implications of the Models for a Sample of Public Firms 
We also use our model to estimate the magnitude of potential distortions in investment decisions 
at 15 public firms, five each from the paper and allied products, beer and wine, and wholesale distribution   32 
industries.  These estimates provide additional insights on the willingness of risk-averse managers at 
levered firms to invest in projects with various levels of risk. 
The firms selected within each industry exhibit considerable variation in leverage, the duration of 
their debt, their marginal tax rate, and/or the stock and options held by the CEO.  Across the 15 firms, 
leverage varies from 6.24 percent (Kimberly-Clark) to 63.44 percent (Valley National), The duration of 
outstanding debt varies from 2 years (Valley National) to 23 years (Mead), the marginal tax rate varies 
from 0.121 (Stewart & Stevenson) to 0.352 (Speizman Industries), stock ownership varies from 0.02 
percent (Boise Cascade) to 75.90 percent (Valley National) of total shares, and option holdings vary from 
0.29 percent (Kimberly-Clark) to 10.66 percent (Golden State Vintners) of total shares.  The actual values 
for each of these variables are used in estimating the investment distortions for each firm. 
For all firms, we assume that the manager has a risk aversion parameter of 2, that the manager’s 
non-firm wealth equals the value of the stock that he owns, and that the drift of the firm and project asset 
values is 5 percent.  The debtholder bankruptcy recovery rate and the exponential growth rate for the 
bankruptcy boundary are selected to yield an expected recovery rate of 45 percent in all cases.  The 
volatility of each firm’s asset value is selected so that the spread between the cost of debt and risk free 
rate is consistent with the firm’s credit risk.  As with our base case estimates, the project’s asset value is 
assumed to equal 20 percent of the firm’s asset value. 
Figure 8 summarizes the results from these estimates.  The most striking feature of the plots in 
Figure 8 is that, with the exception of Mead (in Figure 8a), the indifference NPV values are positive for 
projects with volatilities more than 1.75 times the respective firm volatilities.
15  For comparison, the 
corresponding ratio for the typical firm with 21.90 percent leverage in Figure 1a is 2.10 times firm 
volatility.  This evidence suggests that managers can have relatively little incentive to invest in highly 
risky projects even when they receive relatively large amounts of option-based compensation.  The plot 
                                                            
15 Note that, instead of the post-project volatility reported in previous figures, we report the ratio of the volatility of 
the project asset value to the volatility of the firm asset on the horizontal axis in each plot in Figure 8.  We do this 
because the asset volatilities, without the project, differ across firms.  This ratio facilitates a more meaningful 
comparison of the results.   33 
for Mead slopes downward due to the long duration of its debt (23 years) and its relatively high leverage 
(30.75 percent).   
V.  Conclusions 
Since Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977), it has often been argued that the managers 
of a levered firm, who usually have a stake in the firm’s equity but not the firm’s debt, have incentives to 
accept projects that are too risky.  In particular, they will accept some relatively risky, negative NPV 
projects, and reject some relatively safe, positive NPV projects.  This discussion generally ignores or 
downplays the importance of managerial risk aversion, which is an important source of conflict between 
stockholders and managers and, consequently, a central consideration in the design of incentive systems 
(Prendergast (1999)).  In addition, risk changes can have important implications for the magnitude of 
other components of firm value, such as expected bankruptcy costs and tax shields.  We know relatively 
little about the various mechanisms through which changes in a firm’s risk affect a manager’s utility, and 
subsequently, the extent to which these changes distort investment decisions. 
  This paper assesses the quantitative importance of the distortion in investment decisions arising 
from a number of factors, with the goal of assessing the relative importance of these factors.  It presents a 
dynamic model in which a manager of a levered firm, who owns a fraction of the equity and holds options 
on this equity, decides whether to undertake a risky project, and does so based on his own utility function.  
The model, calibrated using current market data and typical firm and manager characteristics, uses 
contingent-claims methods to estimate the values of the firm’s equity, debt, debt tax shields, expected 
bankruptcy costs, and the extent to which all of these values change when the firm adopts a project.  We 
calculate the magnitude of the distortion in the investment decision, as well as the importance of factors 
that affect the magnitude of this distortion.  In contrast to most empirical studies in corporate finance, 
which examine the qualitative predictions of various models, this paper derives quantitative predictions 
from a model that is calibrated to reflect real-world data.   34 
  The results suggest that the distortion in investment decisions arising from managerial risk 
aversion is significant.  In our base-case scenario it is more important than the distortion due to 
stockholder/debtholder conflicts.  The reluctance of a manager to undertake a project generally increases 
with the project’s risk, despite the fact that the magnitude of the wealth transfer from debtholders to 
stockholders also increases with project risk.  Our results are thus consistent with the growing literature 
suggesting that total firm risk, in addition to systematic risk, is an important factor in the decision-making 
process (see, for example, Graham and Smith (1999), Shin and Stulz (2000), Goyal and Santa-Clara 
(2001), and Meulbroek (2001)). 
  In addition, we find that debt tax shields and bankruptcy costs are important factors in the 
decision to adopt a project that changes a firm’s risk.  Both debt tax shields and bankruptcy costs change 
in value substantially when adoption of a project alters a firm’s total risk.  Tax shields and bankruptcy 
costs are often emphasized in the “tradeoff” theory of optimal capital structure.  We show that they have 
other important implications that are not emphasized by the literature.  In particular, once a firm’s capital 
structure is in place, risk changes affect the values of both the firm’s future debt tax shields and expected 
bankruptcy costs.  The changes in the values of debt tax shields and bankruptcy costs cause managers of 
levered firms to make different investment decisions than managers of unlevered firms.  These changes 
result in distortions in investment decisions, ex post, in a manner similar to that posited by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) for wealth transfers between stockholders and debtholders.  However, 
the debt tax shield and bankruptcy cost effects move in the opposite direction from the wealth transfer 
effect, providing incentives for managers at levered firms to adopt projects that are overly safe, rather 
than excessively risky. 
  Our model suggests that once these factors are considered, a manager who holds stock and 
options in proportion to the median ownership of CEOs at large publicly-traded corporations is likely to 
behave in an overly risk-averse manner in selecting projects.  The manager will accept some safe, 
negative NPV projects, and reject some risky, positive NPV projects.  Three factors, the manager’s risk   35 
aversion, the changes of in the value of tax shields, and changes in the value of expected future 
bankruptcy costs, each work towards making relatively safe projects more desirable and relatively risky 
projects less desirable.  These three factors provide incentives for managers to avoid additional firm risk, 
even at the cost of firm value. 
  We also find that the magnitude of the distortion we document is sensitive to model parameters.  
Not surprisingly, the choice of the risk-aversion parameter has a large impact.  Similarly, the fraction of 
the manager’s wealth outside the firm is an important determinant of the distortion due to managerial risk 
aversion, as are the project size and debt maturity.  Finally, we contribute to the literature on executive 
compensation by documenting the benefits of options relative to stock grants as means of providing risk-
averse managers with incentives to accept risky projects, and how granting in-the-money options can 
provide managers with incentives to become excessively cautious. 
Much work in corporate finance has focused on the existence of distortions in investment 
resulting from contracting problems.  Yet, evaluating the circumstances under which various distortions 
are important and the circumstances under which they are not has proven to be difficult.  This paper 
applies a quantitative approach to estimating the magnitude of these distortions.  Using this approach 
allows us to identify and evaluate the importance of effects that have not been emphasized by the 
literature to this point.  In particular, once a capital structure is in place, risk changes can have a large 
impact on the value of existing components of firm value, especially debt tax shields and bankruptcy 
costs.   36 
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Appendix  
Closed-form expressions for the integrals defined in equations (14) through (16). 
 
 
  Ju (2001) derives the following expression for the integrals defined in equations (14) through (16): 
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Tu  1  Time at which manager evaluates utility 
T  10  Time at which debt matures 
r  0.0522  Annualized risk-free rate 
() 0 NP V   $100  Initial value of assets of firm with no project 
() 0 P V   $120  Initial value of assets of firm with project 
NP µ   0.05  Drift of value of assets of firm with no project 
P µ   0.05  Drift of value of assets of firm with project 
NP σ   0.32  Volatility of value of assets of firm with no 
project 
P σ   0.29695  Volatility of value of assets of firm with 
project (with ρ  = 0.5) 
NNP  100  Total shares outstanding with no project 
FNP  $22.47  Face value of debt with no project (yields 
market debt/capital ratio of 21.90% at T0) 
 γ    2  Manager’s risk aversion parameter 
NMan (< NNP)  0.32  Number of shares owned by manager 
Calls N   0.38  Number of exchange traded European calls 
owned by manager 
K  $0.801415  Strike price of calls 
() 0 NFW   $0.256453  Manager’s non-firm wealth in dollars at time 
zero 
BC α   0.4806  1 - Debtholder bankruptcy recovery rate 
g  0.0519  Bankruptcy boundary exponential growth rate Table I (continued) 
 
Panel A: Chosen Parameters (continued) 
 
P COST   $20  Cost of the project in dollars 
τ  0.34  Effective tax rate for debt tax shield 
DivRate  0.015  Dividend payout rate to equity holders as a 
percentage of the unlevered value of the firm. Table I (continued) 
 
Panel B: Derived Variables 
Variable Variable  Description 
FP  Face value of debt with project 
NP  Total shares outstanding with project 
() 0 NP E   Initial total value of equity with no project 
() 0 P E   Initial total value of equity with project 
() 0 NP D   Initial total value of debt with no project 
() 0 P D   Initial total value of debt with project 
() 0 NP BC   Initial total value of bankruptcy costs with no 
project 
() 0 P BC   Initial total value of bankruptcy costs with 
project 
() 0 NP TB   Initial total value of tax benefits of debt with 
no project 
() 0 P TB   Initial total value of tax benefits of debt with 
project 
() u NFW T   Value of manager’s non-firm wealth at time  u T  
NP C  
Constant annualized coupon rate paid by the 
debt when there is no project.  This is set to 
price the debt without the project at par. 
P C   Constant annualized coupon rate paid by the 
debt when the project is accepted 
UtilityNP(0)  Expected future value of manager’s utility with 
no project 
UtilityP(0)  Expected future value of manager’s utility with 
project 
Indiff
P COST   The cost of the project at which the manager is 
indifferent to taking it 
NP φ  
Discounted risk-neutral expected value of the 
quantity  () ()0 NP NP VT V  
P φ  
Discounted risk-neutral expected value of the 
quantity  () ()0 PP VTV  
() 0
Dynamic
NP E   Initial total value of equity with no project  
Table I (continued) 
 
Panel B: Derived Variables (continued) 
() 0
Dynamic
P E   Initial total value of equity with project 
() 0
Dynamic












P TB   Initial total value of tax benefits of debt with 
project 
δ   After tax cash payout rate to both debtholders 
and equity holders as a percentage of the 
unlevered value of the firm. 
 Row 0.2667 0.2800 0.2949 0.3110 0.3283 0.3465 0.3655 0.3852 0.4055 0.4263 0.4475 0.4691 0.4910 0.5132 0.5357 0.5583
Impact of Project on Volatility of Firm Value
1)    Volatility of Firm Value without Project 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200
2)    Volatility of Firm Value with Project 0.2667 0.2800 0.2949 0.3110 0.3283 0.3465 0.3655 0.3852 0.4055 0.4263 0.4475 0.4691 0.4910 0.5132 0.5357 0.5583
Leverage (Debt/(Debt+Equity))
3)    Leverage without Project 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90%
4)    Leverage with Project 22.52% 22.36% 22.16% 21.94% 21.70% 21.44% 21.16% 20.87% 20.57% 20.26% 19.95% 19.64% 19.32% 19.01% 18.71% 18.41%
Value of Debt
5)    Face Value of Debt without Project $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47
6)       Initial Value of Debt without Project $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47
7)    Face Value of Debt with Project $26.61 $26.67 $26.73 $26.81 $26.89 $26.98 $27.08 $27.19 $27.30 $27.43 $27.55 $27.68 $27.82 $27.96 $28.10 $28.25
8)       Initial Value of Debt with Project $28.16 $27.85 $27.49 $27.10 $26.66 $26.21 $25.73 $25.25 $24.75 $24.25 $23.76 $23.27 $22.79 $22.32 $21.86 $21.42
9)    Face Value of New Debt $4.14 $4.19 $4.26 $4.33 $4.42 $4.51 $4.61 $4.72 $4.83 $4.95 $5.08 $5.21 $5.35 $5.49 $5.63 $5.78
10)    Difference in Value of Debt $5.69 $5.38 $5.02 $4.62 $4.19 $3.74 $3.26 $2.77 $2.28 $1.78 $1.29 $0.80 $0.32 -$0.15 -$0.61 -$1.05
11)    ∆  Value of Original Debt $1.31 $1.00 $0.64 $0.24 -$0.19 -$0.64 -$1.12 -$1.61 -$2.10 -$2.60 -$3.09 -$3.58 -$4.06 -$4.53 -$4.99 -$5.43
12)    ∆  Value of Original Debt: Tax Rate = 0 $1.27 $0.96 $0.60 $0.20 -$0.24 -$0.70 -$1.17 -$1.66 -$2.16 -$2.66 -$3.15 -$3.64 -$4.12 -$4.59 -$5.05 -$5.50
13)    ∆  Value of Original Debt:  BC = 0 $0.41 $0.32 $0.21 $0.09 -$0.06 -$0.22 -$0.39 -$0.58 -$0.78 -$0.98 -$1.19 -$1.41 -$1.63 -$1.85 -$2.07 -$2.29
14)    ∆  Value of Original Debt: Tax Rate  & BC = 0 $0.40 $0.31 $0.20 $0.07 -$0.07 -$0.23 -$0.41 -$0.60 -$0.79 -$1.00 -$1.21 -$1.43 -$1.65 -$1.87 -$2.09 -$2.31
Value of Equity
15)    Total Shares Outstanding without Project 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
16)       Initial Value of Equity without Project 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14
17)    Total Shares Outstanding with Project 119.22 119.26 119.30 119.34 119.39 119.43 119.47 119.50 119.54 119.57 119.59 119.62 119.64 119.66 119.68 119.69
18)       Initial Value of Equity with Project 96.90 96.73 96.56 96.38 96.20 96.02 95.86 95.71 95.58 95.45 95.34 95.24 95.15 95.07 95.00 94.94
19)    ∆  Value of Original Equity $1.14 $0.97 $0.80 $0.61 $0.43 $0.26 $0.10 -$0.05 -$0.18 -$0.31 -$0.42 -$0.52 -$0.61 -$0.69 -$0.76 -$0.82
20)    ∆  Value of Original Equity: Tax Rate = 0 -$0.56 -$0.63 -$0.69 -$0.75 -$0.78 -$0.81 -$0.81 -$0.79 -$0.76 -$0.71 -$0.64 -$0.57 -$0.48 -$0.39 -$0.29 -$0.18
21)    ∆  Value of Original Equity:  BC = 0 $0.93 $0.93 $0.94 $0.95 $0.97 $1.00 $1.04 $1.08 $1.13 $1.19 $1.25 $1.32 $1.39 $1.46 $1.54 $1.61
22)    ∆  Value of Original Equity: Tax Rate  & BC = 0 -$0.40 -$0.31 -$0.20 -$0.07 $0.07 $0.23 $0.41 $0.60 $0.79 $1.00 $1.21 $1.43 $1.65 $1.87 $2.09 $2.31
Value of Tax Shields
23)    Total Value of Tax Shields without Project $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30
24)    Total Value of Tax Shields with Project $7.96 $7.86 $7.75 $7.62 $7.47 $7.32 $7.16 $6.99 $6.81 $6.64 $6.46 $6.28 $6.10 $5.92 $5.74 $5.57
25)    Change in Value of Tax Shields $1.66 $1.56 $1.44 $1.31 $1.17 $1.01 $0.85 $0.68 $0.51 $0.33 $0.15 -$0.03 -$0.21 -$0.38 -$0.56 -$0.73
Bankruptcy Costs
26)    Bankruptcy Costs without Project $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69
27)    Bankruptcy Costs with Project $2.90 $3.28 $3.70 $4.14 $4.61 $5.08 $5.56 $6.03 $6.49 $6.93 $7.36 $7.76 $8.15 $8.53 $8.88 $9.21
28)    Change in Bankruptcy Costs -$0.79 -$0.41 $0.01 $0.45 $0.92 $1.39 $1.87 $2.34 $2.80 $3.24 $3.67 $4.07 $4.47 $4.84 $5.19 $5.52
Impact of Project on Manager
29)    Change in Managers Utility From Zero NPV Project 0.0323 0.0263 0.0195 0.0118 0.0034 -0.0057 -0.0154 -0.0257 -0.0366 -0.0480 -0.0600 -0.0725 -0.0856 -0.0992 -0.1133 -0.1279
30)    Change in Managers Utility From Zero NPV Project with No Options 0.0357 0.0283 0.0201 0.0110 0.0012 -0.0093 -0.0205 -0.0324 -0.0453 -0.0595 -0.0753 -0.0931 -0.1134 -0.1365 -0.1627 -0.1920
31)    Project Cost where Manager is Indifferent $22.19 $21.81 $21.35 $20.83 $20.24 $19.59 $18.86 $18.06 $17.18 $16.22 $15.18 $14.03 $12.79 $11.43 $9.96 $8.35
   NPV Where Manager is Indifferent:
32)       Base Case -$2.19 -$1.81 -$1.35 -$0.83 -$0.24 $0.41 $1.14 $1.94 $2.82 $3.78 $4.82 $5.97 $7.21 $8.57 $10.04 $11.65
33)       Tax Rate =0 -$0.37 -$0.09 $0.22 $0.58 $0.99 $1.44 $1.94 $2.49 $3.10 $3.77 $4.51 $5.32 $6.22 $7.21 $8.30 $9.50
34)       BC =0 -$1.87 -$1.68 -$1.44 -$1.15 -$0.81 -$0.40 $0.08 $0.63 $1.26 $1.97 $2.77 $3.67 $4.66 $5.77 $7.00 $8.36
35)       BC & Tax Rate = 0 -$0.41 -$0.34 -$0.23 -$0.09 $0.09 $0.32 $0.60 $0.93 $1.33 $1.80 $2.35 $2.97 $3.69 $4.50 $5.42 $6.45
36)       Risk Neutral Manager, BC & Tax Rate = 0 $1.96 $1.47 $0.93 $0.33 -$0.30 -$0.97 -$1.67 -$2.38 -$3.11 -$3.85 -$4.60 -$5.36 -$6.11 -$6.87 -$7.62 -$8.37
37)       Risk Neutral Manager Owns No Options, BC & Tax Rate = 0 $0.44 $0.34 $0.22 $0.08 -$0.08 -$0.25 -$0.45 -$0.65 -$0.87 -$1.10 -$1.33 -$1.57 -$1.81 -$2.05 -$2.29 -$2.53
   Incremental Cost of Equity Where Manager is Indifferent:
38)       Base Case -0.66% -0.56% -0.43% -0.27% -0.08% 0.14% 0.40% 0.71% 1.09% 1.54% 2.10% 2.80% 3.71% 4.91% 6.60% 9.12%
39)       Tax Rate =0 -0.12% -0.03% 0.08% 0.21% 0.36% 0.52% 0.72% 0.96% 1.23% 1.55% 1.94% 2.41% 2.99% 3.73% 4.68% 5.96%
40)       BC =0 -0.57% -0.52% -0.45% -0.36% -0.26% -0.13% 0.03% 0.22% 0.45% 0.72% 1.07% 1.49% 2.01% 2.68% 3.55% 4.73%
41)       BC & Tax Rate = 0 -0.14% -0.11% -0.08% -0.03% 0.03% 0.11% 0.21% 0.33% 0.48% 0.66% 0.89% 1.16% 1.51% 1.93% 2.47% 3.16%
42)       Risk Neutral Manager, BC & Tax Rate = 0 0.73% 0.54% 0.33% 0.11% -0.10% -0.31% -0.52% -0.71% -0.90% -1.08% -1.25% -1.41% -1.56% -1.70% -1.83% -1.96%
43)       Risk Neutral Manager Owns No Options, BC & Tax Rate = 0 0.15% 0.12% 0.08% 0.03% -0.03% -0.08% -0.15% -0.21% -0.28% -0.35% -0.42% -0.48% -0.55% -0.62% -0.68% -0.74%
Volatility of Firm Asset Value With Project
Table II
Model Output for Projects with Different Volatilities where Market Debt/Equity for Project Financing Equals Market Debt/Equity Ratio of Firm Without Project
Values are for a firm with a value of $100 without the project, a project costing $20, and a drift parameter for the value of the firm of 5%.Row 0.2667 0.2800 0.2949 0.3110 0.3283 0.3465 0.3655 0.3852 0.4055 0.4263 0.4475 0.4691 0.4910 0.5132 0.5357 0.5583
Impact of Project on Volatility of Firm Value
1)    Volatility of Firm Value without Project 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200
2)    Volatility of Firm Value with Project 0.2667 0.2800 0.2949 0.3110 0.3283 0.3465 0.3655 0.3852 0.4055 0.4263 0.4475 0.4691 0.4910 0.5132 0.5357 0.5583
Leverage (Debt/(Debt+Equity))
3)    Leverage without Project 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90%
4)    Leverage with Project 28.71% 26.89% 24.96% 22.96% 20.95% 18.97% 17.05% 15.22% 13.50% 11.89% 10.41% 9.06% 7.83% 6.73% 5.76% 4.89%
Value of Debt
5)    Face Value of Debt without Project $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47
6)       Initial Value of Debt without Project $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47
7)    Face Value of Debt with Project $35.61 $33.29 $30.83 $28.31 $25.77 $23.29 $20.89 $18.61 $16.46 $14.48 $12.65 $10.99 $9.49 $8.15 $6.96 $5.91
8)       Initial Value of Debt with Project $35.61 $33.29 $30.83 $28.31 $25.77 $23.29 $20.89 $18.61 $16.46 $14.48 $12.65 $10.99 $9.49 $8.15 $6.96 $5.91
9)    Face Value of New Debt $13.14 $10.82 $8.36 $5.83 $3.30 $0.81 -$1.59 -$3.87 -$6.01 -$8.00 -$9.82 -$11.48 -$12.98 -$14.32 -$15.52 -$16.57
10)    Difference in Value of Debt $13.14 $10.82 $8.36 $5.83 $3.30 $0.81 -$1.59 -$3.87 -$6.01 -$8.00 -$9.82 -$11.48 -$12.98 -$14.32 -$15.52 -$16.57
11)    ∆  Value of Original Debt $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
12)    ∆  Value of Original Debt: Tax Rate = 0 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
13)    ∆  Value of Original Debt:  BC = 0 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
14)    ∆  Value of Original Debt: Tax Rate  & BC = 0 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Value of Equity
15)    Total Shares Outstanding without Project 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
16)       Initial Value of Equity without Project 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14
17)    Total Shares Outstanding with Project 108.42 111.29 114.36 117.53 120.74 123.90 126.98 129.93 132.72 135.32 137.72 139.92 141.92 143.72 145.32 146.73
18)       Initial Value of Equity with Project 88.41 90.50 92.71 94.97 97.24 99.45 101.59 103.61 105.51 107.26 108.88 110.34 111.66 112.84 113.89 114.81
19)    ∆  Value of Original Equity $1.41 $1.18 $0.93 $0.66 $0.39 $0.12 -$0.14 -$0.40 -$0.64 -$0.87 -$1.09 -$1.28 -$1.46 -$1.62 -$1.77 -$1.89
20)    ∆  Value of Original Equity: Tax Rate = 0 -$2.09 -$1.73 -$1.34 -$0.95 -$0.55 -$0.16 $0.22 $0.59 $0.93 $1.25 $1.55 $1.82 $2.07 $2.29 $2.49 $2.67
21)    ∆  Value of Original Equity:  BC = 0 $2.85 $2.36 $1.84 $1.30 $0.75 $0.21 -$0.31 -$0.81 -$1.28 -$1.73 -$2.13 -$2.50 -$2.84 -$3.14 -$3.41 -$3.65
22)    ∆  Value of Original Equity: Tax Rate  & BC = 0 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Value of Tax Shields
23)    Total Value of Tax Shields without Project $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30
24)    Total Value of Tax Shields with Project $9.80 $9.21 $8.58 $7.92 $7.25 $6.59 $5.94 $5.32 $4.73 $4.18 $3.67 $3.20 $2.77 $2.39 $2.04 $1.74
25)    Change in Value of Tax Shields $3.50 $2.91 $2.27 $1.61 $0.94 $0.28 -$0.37 -$0.99 -$1.58 -$2.13 -$2.64 -$3.11 -$3.53 -$3.92 -$4.26 -$4.56
Bankruptcy Costs
26)    Bankruptcy Costs without Project $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69
27)    Bankruptcy Costs with Project $5.78 $5.42 $5.03 $4.64 $4.24 $3.85 $3.47 $3.10 $2.76 $2.43 $2.14 $1.87 $1.62 $1.40 $1.20 $1.02
28)    Change in Bankruptcy Costs $2.09 $1.73 $1.34 $0.95 $0.55 $0.16 -$0.22 -$0.59 -$0.93 -$1.25 -$1.55 -$1.82 -$2.07 -$2.29 -$2.49 -$2.67
Impact of Project on Manager
29)    Change in Managers Utility From Zero NPV Project 0.0229 0.0192 0.0149 0.0101 0.0047 -0.0010 -0.0072 -0.0137 -0.0206 -0.0277 -0.0352 -0.0429 -0.0510 -0.0593 -0.0680 -0.0769
30)    Change in Managers Utility From Zero NPV Project with No Options 0.0223 0.0183 0.0137 0.0086 0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0094 -0.0162 -0.0233 -0.0306 -0.0383 -0.0463 -0.0545 -0.0631 -0.0719 -0.0810
31)    Project Cost where Manager is Indifferent $21.59 $21.34 $21.05 $20.71 $20.34 $19.93 $19.48 $18.99 $18.48 $17.92 $17.33 $16.71 $16.04 $15.33 $14.57 $13.76
   NPV Where Manager is Indifferent:
32)       Base Case -$1.59 -$1.34 -$1.05 -$0.71 -$0.34 $0.07 $0.52 $1.01 $1.52 $2.08 $2.67 $3.29 $3.96 $4.67 $5.43 $6.24
33)       Tax Rate =0 $2.06 $2.06 $2.06 $2.06 $2.06 $2.06 $2.06 $2.06 $2.06 $2.06 $2.06 $2.06 $2.06 $2.06 $2.06 $2.06
34)       BC =0 -$3.06 -$2.55 -$1.98 -$1.35 -$0.68 $0.03 $0.78 $1.56 $2.36 $3.19 $4.04 $4.92 $5.83 $6.78 $7.76 $8.78
35)       BC & Tax Rate = 0 -$0.17 -$0.17 -$0.17 -$0.17 -$0.17 -$0.17 -$0.17 -$0.17 -$0.17 -$0.17 -$0.17 -$0.17 -$0.17 -$0.17 -$0.17 -$0.17
36)       Risk Neutral Manager, BC & Tax Rate = 0 $1.13 $0.83 $0.52 $0.18 -$0.17 -$0.52 -$0.89 -$1.26 -$1.64 -$2.02 -$2.41 -$2.81 -$3.21 -$3.61 -$4.02 -$4.44
37)       Risk Neutral Manager Owns No Options, BC & Tax Rate = 0 $0.34 $0.24 $0.14 $0.05 -$0.04 -$0.12 -$0.20 -$0.26 -$0.32 -$0.38 -$0.42 -$0.47 -$0.50 -$0.53 -$0.56 -$0.58
   Incremental Cost of Equity Where Manager is Indifferent:
38)       Base Case -0.53% -0.45% -0.35% -0.23% -0.11% 0.02% 0.17% 0.34% 0.52% 0.72% 0.95% 1.21% 1.50% 1.84% 2.24% 2.72%
39)       Tax Rate =0 0.87% 0.66% 0.49% 0.34% 0.20% 0.09% 0.01% -0.06% -0.11% -0.13% -0.14% -0.12% -0.09% -0.03% 0.05% 0.16%
40)       BC =0 -0.95% -0.80% -0.63% -0.43% -0.22% 0.01% 0.26% 0.54% 0.84% 1.18% 1.56% 2.00% 2.51% 3.10% 3.81% 4.69%
41)       BC & Tax Rate = 0 -0.06% -0.06% -0.04% -0.02% 0.02% 0.06% 0.12% 0.19% 0.27% 0.37% 0.49% 0.64% 0.80% 1.00% 1.24% 1.52%
42)       Risk Neutral Manager, BC & Tax Rate = 0 0.45% 0.31% 0.19% 0.06% -0.05% -0.17% -0.27% -0.38% -0.48% -0.57% -0.66% -0.75% -0.84% -0.93% -1.01% -1.09%
43)       Risk Neutral Manager Owns No Options, BC & Tax Rate = 0 0.13% 0.09% 0.05% 0.02% -0.01% -0.04% -0.06% -0.08% -0.10% -0.12% -0.13% -0.14% -0.15% -0.16% -0.16% -0.17%
Volatility of Firm Asset Value With Project
Table III
Model Output for Projects with Different Volatilities where the Debtholders of the Firm Without the Project are Made Whole
Values are for a firm with a value of $100 without the project, a project costing $20, and a drift parameter for the value of the firm of 5%.Row 0.2667 0.2800 0.2949 0.3110 0.3283 0.3465 0.3655 0.3852 0.4055 0.4263 0.4475 0.4691 0.4910 0.5132 0.5357 0.5583
Impact of Project on Volatility of Firm Value
1)    Volatility of Firm Value without Project 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200 0.3200
2)    Volatility of Firm Value with Project 0.2667 0.2800 0.2949 0.3110 0.3283 0.3465 0.3655 0.3852 0.4055 0.4263 0.4475 0.4691 0.4910 0.5132 0.5357 0.5583
Leverage (Debt/(Debt+Equity))
3)    Leverage without Project 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90%
4)    Leverage with Project 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90% 21.90%
Value of Debt
5)    Face Value of Debt without Project $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47
6)       Initial Value of Debt without Project $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47 $22.47
7)    Face Value of Debt with Project $25.76 $26.03 $26.35 $26.74 $27.18 $27.68 $28.24 $28.84 $29.50 $30.19 $30.92 $31.69 $32.48 $33.30 $34.13 $34.98
8)       Initial Value of Debt with Project $27.40 $27.29 $27.17 $27.04 $26.90 $26.74 $26.58 $26.42 $26.25 $26.08 $25.90 $25.73 $25.56 $25.39 $25.22 $25.06
9)    Face Value of New Debt $3.28 $3.55 $3.88 $4.27 $4.71 $5.21 $5.77 $6.37 $7.02 $7.72 $8.45 $9.22 $10.01 $10.83 $11.66 $12.51
10)    Difference in Value of Debt $4.92 $4.82 $4.70 $4.57 $4.43 $4.27 $4.11 $3.94 $3.77 $3.60 $3.43 $3.26 $3.09 $2.92 $2.75 $2.58
11)    ∆  Value of Original Debt $1.43 $1.09 $0.70 $0.25 -$0.24 -$0.76 -$1.32 -$1.89 -$2.48 -$3.06 -$3.65 -$4.23 -$4.79 -$5.34 -$5.87 -$6.38
12)    ∆  Value of Original Debt: Tax Rate = 0 $1.43 $1.10 $0.70 $0.25 -$0.24 -$0.77 -$1.32 -$1.90 -$2.49 -$3.08 -$3.67 -$4.25 -$4.82 -$5.37 -$5.91 -$6.42
13)    ∆  Value of Original Debt:  BC = 0 $0.42 $0.32 $0.21 $0.08 -$0.07 -$0.25 -$0.43 -$0.64 -$0.85 -$1.08 -$1.31 -$1.55 -$1.79 -$2.03 -$2.27 -$2.51
14)    ∆  Value of Original Debt: Tax Rate  & BC = 0 $0.42 $0.33 $0.21 $0.08 -$0.08 -$0.25 -$0.44 -$0.64 -$0.86 -$1.09 -$1.32 -$1.56 -$1.81 -$2.06 -$2.30 -$2.54
Value of Equity
15)    Total Shares Outstanding without Project 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
16)       Initial Value of Equity without Project 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14 80.14
17)    Total Shares Outstanding with Project 120.33 120.08 119.77 119.42 119.03 118.61 118.16 117.70 117.22 116.74 116.26 115.80 115.34 114.91 114.49 114.10
18)       Initial Value of Equity with Project 97.70 97.33 96.91 96.44 95.92 95.37 94.80 94.21 93.60 92.99 92.37 91.76 91.14 90.54 89.94 89.35
19)    ∆  Value of Original Equity $1.05 $0.92 $0.77 $0.61 $0.44 $0.27 $0.09 -$0.10 -$0.29 -$0.49 -$0.69 -$0.90 -$1.12 -$1.35 -$1.59 -$1.83
20)    ∆  Value of Original Equity: Tax Rate = 0 -$0.40 -$0.49 -$0.59 -$0.69 -$0.78 -$0.88 -$0.97 -$1.06 -$1.14 -$1.23 -$1.31 -$1.40 -$1.49 -$1.59 -$1.69 -$1.80
21)    ∆  Value of Original Equity:  BC = 0 $0.90 $0.92 $0.95 $0.99 $1.03 $1.09 $1.16 $1.25 $1.33 $1.43 $1.53 $1.64 $1.74 $1.85 $1.96 $2.07
22)    ∆  Value of Original Equity: Tax Rate  & BC = 0 -$0.42 -$0.33 -$0.21 -$0.08 $0.08 $0.25 $0.44 $0.64 $0.86 $1.09 $1.32 $1.56 $1.81 $2.06 $2.30 $2.54
Value of Tax Shields
23)    Total Value of Tax Shields without Project $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30 $6.30
24)    Total Value of Tax Shields with Project $7.76 $7.72 $7.66 $7.60 $7.53 $7.45 $7.36 $7.25 $7.14 $7.03 $6.90 $6.77 $6.63 $6.49 $6.34 $6.19
25)    Change in Value of Tax Shields $1.46 $1.41 $1.36 $1.30 $1.23 $1.14 $1.05 $0.95 $0.84 $0.72 $0.60 $0.47 $0.33 $0.18 $0.04 -$0.12
Bankruptcy Costs
26)    Bankruptcy Costs without Project $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69 $3.69
27)    Bankruptcy Costs with Project $2.66 $3.09 $3.58 $4.12 $4.71 $5.33 $5.97 $6.63 $7.30 $7.96 $8.63 $9.28 $9.93 $10.56 $11.18 $11.78
28)    Change in Bankruptcy Costs -$1.03 -$0.60 -$0.11 $0.43 $1.02 $1.64 $2.28 $2.94 $3.61 $4.27 $4.94 $5.59 $6.24 $6.87 $7.49 $8.09
Impact of Project on Manager
29)    Change in Managers Utility From Zero NPV Project 0.0321 0.0264 0.0197 0.0119 0.0030 -0.0069 -0.0178 -0.0298 -0.0428 -0.0568 -0.0719 -0.0879 -0.1050 -0.1230 -0.1420 -0.1618
30)    Change in Managers Utility From Zero NPV Project with No Options 0.0361 0.0289 0.0205 0.0111 0.0007 -0.0108 -0.0234 -0.0375 -0.0536 -0.0726 -0.0955 -0.1235 -0.1576 -0.1985 -0.2462 -0.3006
31)    Project Cost where Manager is Indifferent $22.17 $21.81 $21.37 $20.84 $20.22 $19.50 $18.67 $17.73 $16.67 $15.47 $14.13 $12.62 $10.94 $9.07 $6.97 $4.64
   NPV Where Manager is Indifferent:
32)       Base Case -$2.17 -$1.81 -$1.37 -$0.84 -$0.22 $0.50 $1.33 $2.27 $3.33 $4.53 $5.87 $7.38 $9.06 $10.93 $13.03 $15.36
33)       Tax Rate =0 -$0.62 -$0.32 $0.05 $0.48 $0.99 $1.57 $2.23 $2.98 $3.83 $4.79 $5.86 $7.06 $8.41 $9.92 $11.60 $13.48
34)       BC =0 -$1.85 -$1.67 -$1.45 -$1.17 -$0.84 -$0.44 $0.03 $0.57 $1.20 $1.93 $2.75 $3.69 $4.75 $5.94 $7.27 $8.76
35)       BC & Tax Rate = 0 -$0.42 -$0.35 -$0.24 -$0.09 $0.09 $0.33 $0.62 $0.97 $1.39 $1.89 $2.47 $3.15 $3.94 $4.84 $5.86 $7.03
36)       Risk Neutral Manager, BC & Tax Rate = 0 $2.00 $1.50 $0.95 $0.34 -$0.31 -$1.00 -$1.72 -$2.47 -$3.24 -$4.02 -$4.81 -$5.61 -$6.42 -$7.23 -$8.03 -$8.84
37)       Risk Neutral Manager Owns No Options, BC & Tax Rate = 0 $0.45 $0.35 $0.23 $0.08 -$0.08 -$0.26 -$0.47 -$0.68 -$0.92 -$1.16 -$1.41 -$1.67 -$1.93 -$2.20 -$2.46 -$2.72
   Incremental Cost of Equity Where Manager is Indifferent:
38)       Base Case -0.66% -0.56% -0.43% -0.27% -0.07% 0.17% 0.48% 0.86% 1.34% 1.96% 2.78% 3.91% 5.54% 8.08% 12.52% 22.17%
39)       Tax Rate =0 -0.21% -0.11% 0.02% 0.17% 0.36% 0.59% 0.86% 1.21% 1.63% 2.17% 2.85% 3.76% 4.99% 6.77% 9.51% 14.24%
40)       BC =0 -0.56% -0.51% -0.45% -0.37% -0.27% -0.14% 0.01% 0.20% 0.43% 0.71% 1.07% 1.51% 2.08% 2.82% 3.81% 5.20%
41)       BC & Tax Rate = 0 -0.14% -0.11% -0.08% -0.03% 0.03% 0.11% 0.21% 0.34% 0.50% 0.70% 0.95% 1.26% 1.65% 2.15% 2.79% 3.65%
42)       Risk Neutral Manager, BC & Tax Rate = 0 0.75% 0.55% 0.33% 0.12% -0.10% -0.32% -0.53% -0.74% -0.94% -1.13% -1.30% -1.47% -1.63% -1.79% -1.93% -2.06%
43)       Risk Neutral Manager Owns No Options, BC & Tax Rate = 0 0.15% 0.12% 0.08% 0.03% -0.03% -0.09% -0.15% -0.22% -0.29% -0.37% -0.44% -0.52% -0.59% -0.67% -0.74% -0.81%
Volatility of Firm Asset Value With Project
Table IV
Model Output for Projects with Different Volatilities Where Leverage Remains Constant
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D/TC = 0.01% with  Project Volatility = 0
D/TC = 21.9% with Project Volatility = 0
D/TC = 50% with  Project Volatility = 0
D/TC = 75% with  Project Volatility = 0
Figure 1a. Implied NPV where the manager is indifferent for different values of firm asset value volatility with the project and where the
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D/TC = 0.01% with  Project Volatility = 0
D/TC = 21.9% with Project Volatility = 0
D/TC = 50% with  Project Volatility = 0
D/TC = 75% with  Project Volatility = 0
Figure 1b. Implied incremental cost of equity where manager is indifferent for different values of firm asset value volatility with the project
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Figure 2a. Implied NPV where manager is indifferent for different values of firm asset value volatility with the project and where the market
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Figure 2b. Implied incremental cost of equity where manager is indifferent for different values of firm asset value volatility with the project and
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manager non-firm wealth = 0.1X share wealth
manager non-firm wealth = share wealth
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manager non-firm wealth = 0.1X share wealth
manager non-firm wealth = share wealth
manager non-firm wealth = 10X share wealth
Figure 3a. Implied NPV where manager is indifferent for different values of firm asset value volatility with the project and where the market
debt/equity ratio for the project financing equals the market debt/equity ratio before the project is adopted.
Figure 3b. Implied incremental cost of equity where manager is indifferent for different values of firm asset value volatility with the project
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t project size = 10%  firm asset value
project size = 20%  firm asset value
project size = 30%  firm asset value
project size = 40%  firm asset value
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project size = 10%  firm asset value
project size = 20%  firm asset value
project size = 30%  firm asset value
project size = 40%  firm asset value
project size = 50%  firm asset value
Figure 4a. Implied NPV where manager is indifferent for different values of firm asset value volatility with the project and where the market
debt/equity ratio for the project financing equals the market debt/equity ratio before the project is adopted.
Figure 4b. Implied incremental cost of equity where manager is indifferent for different values of firm asset value volatility with the project
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t debt duration = 5 years
debt duration = 10 years
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debt duration = 5 years
debt duration = 10 years
debt duration = 15 years
Figure 5a. Implied NPV where manager is indifferent for different values of firm asset value volatility with the project and where the market
debt/equity ratio for the project financing equals the market debt/equity ratio before the project is adopted.
Figure 5b.  Implied incremental cost of equity where manager is indifferent for different values of firm asset value volatility with the project and 
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Figure 6a. Implied NPV where manager is indifferent for different values of firm asset value volatility with the project and where the market
debt/equity ratio for the project financing equals the market debt/equity ratio before the project is adopted.
Figure 6b.  Implied incremental cost of equity where manager is indifferent for different values of firm asset value volatility with the project and 
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t strike price = 50% FMV
strike price = 100% FMV










0.2667 0.2800 0.2949 0.3110 0.3283 0.3465 0.3655 0.3852 0.4055 0.4263 0.4475 0.4691 0.4910 0.5132 0.5357 0.5583
































































strike price = 50% FMV
strike price = 100% FMV
strike price = 150% FMV
Figure 7a. Implied NPV where manager is indifferent for different values of firm asset value volatility with the project and where the market
debt/equity ratio for the project financing equals the market debt/equity ratio before the project is adopted.
Figure 7b.  Implied incremental cost of equity where manager is indifferent for different values of firm asset value volatility with the project and 
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Figure 8c. Wholesale Distribution Firms. Implied NPV where the manager is indifferent for different values of project volatility and where
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Figure 8a. Paper and Allied Product Manufacturing Firms. Implied NPV where the manager is indifferent for different values of project
volatility and where the market debt/equity ratio for the project financing equals the market debt/equity ratio before the project is
adopted.
Figure 8b. Beer and Wine Manufacturing Firms. Implied NPV where the manager is indifferent for different values of project volatility and
where the market debt/equity ratio for the project financing equals the market debt/equity ratio before the project is adopted.